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Abstract 
The advent of multi-technologies networks offering the service continuum over multiple 
network infrastructures implies new challenges to integrated management.  One of this 
challenge is the auto-configuration of the management plane needed to allow dynamic 
relationships among several managers and one management agent. This paper proposes 
the use of provisional policies in order to dynamically auto-configure the access control 
plane of a management agent. This allows simple management based on agent location 
and time as well as the cooperative behavior of several managers. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Recent advances in providing multiple services over heterogeneous networks demand a new 
approach for constructing the management plane.  The management paradigms used in today 
networks are based on the manager agent model (designed in the mid 80’) which defines a 
protocol for exchanging management information, specified according to an information 
model and stored in a conceptual repository, called Management Information Base (MIB). 
In this approach and for the last decade, the management plane was configured in a static 
manner. For instance a basic configuration of the management protocol established at an 
agent boot time is always assumed to exist. Such an assumption does not hold any more when 
we are trying to manage nomadic equipment, multi-homed sites and dynamic service 
infrastructures.  In this paper we address the issue of providing a management approach which 
extends the SNMPv3 framework allowing the dynamic configuration of the access control to 
MIB objects using a context specific access control to MIB objects. The automatic 
configuration of the management plane is an essential step towards fully integrated 
management. Including self-management features within the management plane is important 
for plug and play type of management, where minimal human interactions are requested. On 
the other hand, existing management frameworks should be easily extended/integrated; 
without demanding a total conceptual and implementation change.    
Our paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the business case and motivation of our 
work. An introduction to provisional authorizations and their usage for the configuration of 
the management stack is given in section 3. The management framework is described in 
section 4, while pointers to related work are given in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper 
by highlighting future work.    
 
2 The Business Case for self-configuration of MIB access 
 
This section presents two very simplified business cases (see figure 1) motivating the 
potential of the self- configuration of the management stack.  
In this first case, Bob owning a WIFI enabled laptop uses his laptop both at home as well as at 
the office.  While Bob is at the office, his laptop should be under the management 
responsibility of the enterprise management platform (EMP). For instance, Bob might not 
even be allowed to auto-administer his laptop.  However, as soon as Bob leaves the office and 
gets home, the same laptop which is connected to the home network should be considered 
under the management responsibility of the home management platform (HMP).  At this 
moment, the enterprise management platform should not be allowed to perform any 
management operations on Bob’s laptop. An extension to the previous case consists in adding 
some additional constraints. Bob’s laptop is owned by the enterprise. If Bob is working at the 
office then his laptop is under the total control of the enterprise management applications. 
However, when Bob connects his laptop to his home network, the home network management 
application might perform management operations if and only if the enterprise network 
management platform approves it.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Simplified Business Case 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the two scenarios in order to abstract the fundamental requirements we can claim 
the following requirements: 
1. Management should be context driven. A context can be defined as the overall 
ensemble of parameters characterizing the instant connectivity. For instance the 
context can be the collection network interfaces, their IP address, netmask, and the 
DNS used. 
2. Management should allow dynamic interactions among several managers, in which a 
manager could approve or deny operations performed between an agent and another 
manager, without requiring direct manager to manager communication.  
 
Does the current management SNMP framework meet these requirements? The answer is 
definitely not. For instance, the most advanced SNMP version (SNMP v3)  [6],  [17] allows to 
offer several views and access rights to the MIB, but these ones are defined statically 
independent of the context. This is done using an enhanced access control module, also 
known as the View Based Access Control Model (VACM)  [6]. 
In the case of the simple scenario presented above, using the current VACM model defined by 
SNMPv3, would imply that the EMP could perform some management operations even when 
Bob is connected from home. This is based on the assumption that Bob will not manually 
configure the VACM every time he connects to a network.  The extended scenario (where 
EMP must authorize management requests performed by HMP) is definitely more 
complicated and can not be implemented with current management paradigms. In the 
following section we will introduce provisional policies and show how an extension of the 
current VACM can be based on provisional authorizations in order to meet the requirements.    
 
Two more additional requirements must be addressed: 
1. There should be no other management protocol than SNMP  [5]. It took several years 
to have a standard management protocol (SNMP v1&2&3), another management 
protocol is difficult to be accepted by the community.  
2. Whatever works right now, should also work in the future. That is, existing 
management applications should be valid and fully working. 
 
 
3 Provisional Authorizations for dynamic access control to MIB objects 
 
Provisional authorizations have been introduced in  [7] and  [8] as a solution towards additional 
semantics for controlling access requests.  Traditional access control systems considered that 
access requests can be modeled as a demand to authorize a particular action 
(read/write/delete) made by a subject within a given context on a particular object.  A 
provisional authorization is a generalization of this scheme, modeling a conditional 
authorization, ie, an access request in granted if and only if additional conditions hold. This 
approach can be applied at the agent site. MIB objects are entities to which read/write 
requests are made. Provisional authorizations are stored on the agent and regulate the access 
to the MIB objects.  
 
The provisional framework for management can be described as follows: 
1. The set S represents all possible subjects requesting access to objects. In  our case, 
these are all managers: For instance in terms of the previously described simple 
scenario  { }HMPEMPS ,=
2. The set of all possible objects is O.  This corresponds to all OIDs in the MIB. 
3. A is the set of access modes permitted on objects. { }setgetA ,=   
4. There is the notion of context, c, representing time and location. The set of contexts is 
C.  A particular context is given by the collection of ipaddress/netmask/DNS used on 
each network interface. In this paper, we will use the term context having this 
definition in mind. The VACM aware reader should not confuse this term with the one 
used to specify a MIB view in SNMPv3. 
5. A permission is either to grant or to deny access. The set of permissions is Perm = 
{grant, denied} 
6.  A set FM of formulas. An individual formula f is a logical conjunction of equalities 
and/or inequalities. For instance t>18 means current time after 18h. An equality or 
inequality is constituted of constant terms (string or numbers) as well system 
accessible variables. System accessible variables are all variables in the MIB. Other 
system specific variables might also be presented.  If a formula holds, then the 
authorization policy is active (see in the following for the definition of an 
authorization policy).   
Examples of formulas could be :  
• “1.3.6.1.2.1.ip.ipInAddrErrors>1000”, allowing to a manger to 
get/set values in a subtree, whenever the number of datagrams errors due to 
address errors is higher then a threshold. While visiting a foreign network, I 
could allow management access to my machine, if and only if I’m starting to 
have functioning errors.  
• “1.3.6.1.2.1.interfaces.ifTable.ifEntry.ifIndex.1.ifOperS
tatus==”down”.  This formula expresses the fact that the first network 
interface of an agent’s node does not work. For a multihomed node, one could 
use this formula to allow a manager connecting via the second interface to 
fully manage the agent if the first network interface is not working. As a 
typical business case, let us consider a access router with two interfaces, used 
by a home network.   Two mangers do exist. The first one belongs to the 
Internet Service Provider, while the second one is used on the home network. 
Such a formula could be used to allow the home manager full control over the 
access router whenever no connection to the ISP’s manager is possible.  
7. A set of provisional actions PRV. A provisional action is used to add new semantics 
on an authorization policy. We provide one single extension verify, meaning that 
another subject agrees with this operation.  For instance verify(HMP) means that HMP 
has to agree with a particular request in order to authorize this access.  We can model 
the agreement of several managers using a list of provisional actions.  Several comma 
separated verify clauses are equivalent to a conjunction of authorizations. All subjects 
must authorize the request. Semi-colon separated list of provisional actions represent 
the fact that at least one entity must authorize the request. These types of actions are 
used in situations when a subset of managers must all agree on a set of actions. The 
second case is addresses the case in which any manager out of a subset has to 
authorize a request.     
 
The configuration of the access control scheme is based on providing a set of authorization 
policies.   
*Pr PRVFMPermCASOAuth ××××××⊂  
 
 An authorization policy, for instance is: 
 
AuthPRHMPverifytimegrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMP
∈>
===
))(,18,
),1.3.224.195,0.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,.*,1.6.3.1(
 
 
modeling the fact that : Manager HMP is allowed to read all elements under the subtree 
1.3.6.1, if the agent is connected with IP address 194.2234.3.23, netmask 255.255.255.0 and 
DNS server 194.224.3.1, and current time is  past 18h, provided that EMP agrees.   
 
An authorization request is a 4 tuple,  
CASOcasoar ×××∈= ),,,(  
meaning that action a in context c is to be performed by s on object o. For the previous 
example, such a request might look like: 
 
))1.3.224.195,0.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,.*,1.6.3.1(
===
=
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMPar  
 
This request models the read operation on OID starting with 1.3.6.1, performed by manager 
EMP, where the current connectivity configuration of the laptop is given by the address, 
netmask and DNS. 
 
For every authorization request, an authorization decision is computed based on the set of 
authorization policies.  Basically, a decision is to either grant or deny an action. Allowing an 
action can be either unconditionally or conditionally. A conditional allow is associated to a 
list of provisional actions. These actions must be performed in order to fully allow the 
operation.  An example based on the previous scenario is the following decision     
 
))(,
),1.3.224.195,0.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,.*,1.6.3.1(
HMPverifygrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMPdecision
===
=
 
 
This decision allows the access for EMP to read all objects in the subtree 1.3.6.1, if the agent 
is on a network (ip address of the agent=194.224.3.23 with netmask 255.255.255.0) if and 
only if HMP agrees.  
The provisional action can include several actions. “verify(HMP), verify(Bob)” is equivalent 
to both Bob and HMP must agree with this decision, while “verify(HMP);verify(Bob)”  means 
that at least one of them must agree. 
 
 
This framework is a generalization of the SNMPv3 VACM architecture. It is very easy to see 
that by using empty sets for the contexts and provisional actions, we can model exactly the 
VACM.  A simple sketch of the proof follows: 
1. The set S corresponds to the set of groups defined in VACM. A group in VACM is a 
set of one or more tuples of the form <securityModel, securityName> .  
2. The set O corresponds to all OIDs. 
3. The securityModel and securityLevel used in the vacmAccessTable can be simulated 
by a formula. 
4. The viewType (read/write) are equivalent to the access operation. 
5. The static configuration of the VACM can be captured by several authorization 
policies. 
 
However, this generalized approach allows us to model context driven and conditional 
management, as well as more advanced interactions between managers as described in the 
two business cases. Another applicability of this framework lies in providing a potential 
solution towards autonomous management. 
For the moment we postpone the presentation of the management architecture needed to 
support this authorization framework, and focus on the semantic expressiveness of this model.  
Let us first see if the two described scenarios can be implemented by our model.  Obviously, 
for the fist scenario, we can use the following four authorization policies: 
 
1.  
),
),1.3.224.152,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.152(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMP
===
 
2.  
),
),1.3.224.152,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.152(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
setEMP
===
 
3.  
),
),1.3.224.195,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getHMP
===
 
4.  
),
),1.3.224.195,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
setHMP
===
 
Policies 1 and 2 state that the enterprise management platform in allowed to get/set any object 
in the MIB as long as Bob’s laptop is on the enterprise network. Policies 3 and 4 model the 
equivalent for the home network. Obviously, dealing with dynamic allocated addresses is 
done by using wildcards in the specifications.  For this scenario, no formulas are requested. 
It’s also easy to see that Bob’s terminal cannot be managed by his office manager, when Bob 
is at home.   
The second scenario, in which Bob’s enterprise manager must agree with the home 
management application, is already presented when we have introduced the provisional 
authorizations. 
Without detailing an implementation specific verification mechanism, let us consider the 
following authorization policy:  
 
))(,,*),*,*,(,,*,2.1.4.1.6.3.1( Bobverifynullgrantdnsnetmaskaddresscontextread ===  
 
This policy models the fact that Bob must be asked by the management agent whenever a get 
request is made on the subtree 1.3.6.1.4.1.2. 
Such flexibility is interesting in the management of mobile devices, in which users could be 
prompted to explicitly authorize operations performed on their terminals (like for instance 
reading their configuration/agenda by a foreign management application).  It could be 
considered as an user-interactive SNMP agent. 
 
Finally, it’s natural to ask if such an authorization policy based approach can be used for total 
self management.  Without pretending to have a clear definition of total self management, we 
argue that at least it might give you the illusion of self management. Imagine the very simple 
case of one authorization policy.  
 
))(,,*),*,*,((*,*,*, managerverifynullgrantdnsnetmaskaddresscontext ===  
 
The intelligence or auto-configuration feature is actually hidden by the existence of a manager 
who authorizes every request.  An agent using such a policy can be easily plugged into any 
network and provide the illusion of being auto-configurable.  The auto-configuration in this 
case is actually outsourced and delegated. This is obviously an extreme case, having a lot of 
overhead in terms of management communication, but it shows that provided the existence of 
an authorization manager and a convenient set of authorization policies, a relative degree of 
autonomy can be achieved.  Such a mechanism is very useful for the management of nomadic 
equipment. The management platform to which the equipment belongs can specify limited 
management operations allowed whenever the equipment is not on the home network and 
might agree to extended management provided it is consulted. As far as we know, no previous 
management framework is capable of similar features.  
 
4 An implementation framework 
 
This section describes the management framework based on the authorization policies. One of 
the requirements was not to depend on a new management protocol.  Taking SNMPv3 as a 
major building block, our approach consists in providing a new Access Control subsystem 
and an optional extension within an SNMP agent.  Figure 2 (adapted from  [6],  [19]) shows 
where the new  access control subsystem and the optional extension fit into the block 
functional architecture of an SNMP agent. 
 
One issue that was not addressed in this paper yet relates to the dynamic interactions among 
an agent and one or several managers. The issue is how do managers and agents discover 
reciprocally, and how to provide an security model for such a framework.  
The existing security model defined in SNMPv3 is implemented in the USM (User Security 
Model)  [18] allowing the authentication of the manager as well as the optional privacy of the 
communication.  For the authentication and privacy, two secret keys are shared between the 
agent and the manager. The first one is used to authenticate the manager, while the second 
one is used to encrypt/decrypt the SNMP operations. While the existence of these two keys 
can be assumed by an off-line exchange among the managers, we consider that full autonomy 
for the management plane is based on a dynamical manager to agent secret key exchange.  
Figure 2 shows two additional components and their interactions. 
 
The first one is a Manager Discoverer. Its main functionality is to discover network managers. 
Several choices are possible: 
 
1. The manager learns though topology monitoring/DHCP the existence of a new node, 
and checking UDP port 161 on the node, discovers the agent. 
2. The address of the manager is included in an extension of the DHCP configuration 
 [10]. An IETF proposition  [15] suggests the use of DHCP to detect a list of IP 
addresses to which notifications have to be sent. 
3. The agent uses the DNS to look for a manager located  the same domain 
4. A management service containing the description of the manager location is 
advertised over SAP  (session announcement protocol)  [12] 
5. The agent discovers via the Service location protocol (SLP)  [11]  the manager.  
 
The information about the manager contains also a public key Public(M)  on which the latter 
is listening.  The manager uses the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)  [13] with the public key 
Public(M) and an associated private key Private(M).  
As soon as a new manager is discovered, two secret keys authk, privk are generated by the 
agent and stored in the MIB of the agent.  Although, the existing SNMPv3 standard 
discourages the storing of secret keys in the MIB, we consider that proper access control 
performed by the agent can assure the required security. 
  
The Manager obtains the two keys by issuing a Get Request. This Request must be 
encapsulated in a SNMPv3 packet having msgSecurityModel equal to 4.  This field describes 
the security model to be used by the agent.  Normally, 1 is used for SNMPv1, 2, SNMPv3 
uses the value of 3 and SNMPv2c uses 2  [6]. 
The value 4 corresponds to our PK security model.  This PK security model checks the 
authenticity of the issued requester using the manager’s public key Public(M).    In fact, our 
extension provides a possible public key exchange facility to a SNMPv3 agent. The 
assumption is here, that the manager discovery process detects a genuine trusted service.   
If authentication is valid (this process is based on the fact that only the legitimate manager has 
the key used for encryption: Private(M)), the two keys (authk, privk) are sent to the manager.  
The response is encrypted using the public key of the manager: Public(M).  
The next interactions between the manager and the agent are performed using the traditional 
security model (msgSecurityModel=3), which is based on symmetric keys (authk, privk) and 
therefore more efficient.  
The second extension consists in a new Access control subsystem, which is used by a SNMP 
engine to check that particular request is authorized.   
 
 
Figure 2: SNMP agent architecture 
 
A block functional decomposition of the Authorization based Access control is shown in 
figure 3.   
Authorization Policies are stored in a Policy store. This store is implementation specific.  A 
policy management console pushes authorization on this store. This configuration can be 
either based on SNMP, similar to the VACM configuration in SNMP3. In this case an 
extended MIB containing tables corresponding to the formulas and the provisional actions are 
needed. Note, that for the address and netmask variables used in the context, the existing 
MIB2 entries can be used. 
Another configuration of these policies can be done using COPS-PR  [4]. One of the 
advantages of COPS-PR lies in its working over TCP.  If the self-management capable agent 
is connected to a distinct network then the one containing the policy console, most firewalls 
will drop SNMP traffic, leaving however TCP connections originating from the agent.  
The Policy Validator is responsible to check the coherence of deployed policies. Its main 
objective is to resolve conflicting authorizations. Two authorizations can conflict, whenever 
one access request simultaneously gets granted and denied. A simple rule to resolve such a 
conflict is to consider the request as denied.  Since policies are very simple allowing only two 
possible actions, the resolution algorithm is simple to be executed by the agent. A conflict can 
be detected between this policy and a second one if: 
1. The two contexts match, 
2. Formulas are included and they hold, 
3. The subjects and the objects in the policies are the same, 
4. One policy authorizes the access and the second denies it. 
  
A Request Processor is the entity where an access request is made. The request processor uses 
the policy store and computes the authorization decision. If access is either granted without 
any provisional actions, or denied, this decision is returned to the SNMP engine.  
If one access request is made: 
1. if the object of this request matches objects in an authorization policy and the subject 
matches the one of the request 
2. and the current context matches the context specified the one specified in the 
authorization policy 
3. and additional formulas hold, 
then access is either denied, granted or additional authorizations are requested.  
 
If access is granted, but an additional verification must be done, the Policy Verification 
Resolver by means of additional information how to perform this verification.  
If the verification clause is “verify(Bob)” and Bob is the user, then a GUI popup menu could 
ask Bob to confirm this decision.  
 
For a clause like “verify(HMP)”, the COPS  [3] protocol could be used in order to outsource a 
decision to a authorization manager policy decision point.  While the COPS protocol was 
introduced in order perform policy based management for assuring QoS over large scale 
network, in our case, we use COPS to manage via authorization policies the management 
stack.  
 
To summarize, authorization policies are configured in the Policy Access Control module of 
the SNMP engine. When such a policy is triggered, an authorization might be requested from 
an authorization manager. This request can be implemented via COPS, in which a explicit 
accept decision is requested from a PDP. Therefore, the concept of policy is twofold. We have 
authorization policies regulating the access rights to the SNMP agent and we have 
authorization requests and replies triggered by an authorization policy.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Functional Architecture of the Access Control subsystem 
 
One interesting example consists in a management approach for a multi-homed host. This 
case, (shown in figure 4) assumes that both managers trust a third manager T. The latter is 
responsible to assure that requests issued by one manager do not alter/expose management 
information to which is not allowed to. For requests issued to particular OIDs, T must 
explicitly approve them.  
The assumption that a common trusted manager exists might be relatively optimistic. If this 
assumption does not hold, both A and B should be asked to allow these requests.   
This can be expressed in an a provisional action might be “verify(A), verify(B)”.  This means, 
that both manager have to approve this request. Obviously, this implies an overhead, but 
provides a solution for either not disclosing A’s confidential monitoring information to B, or 
allowing B to configure A’s related entities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 : Management of a Multi-homed  host 
 
To see the usage of COPS for authorization checking, assume that A issues a Set on a OID 
and that the Control Subsystem decides to grant it, provided T confirms. 
The Control subsystem issues COPS Request Message [3] to T. The COPS-context in this 
message is set to “Set”, (it would have been “Get” for a Get Request).  Additional COPS-type 
objects in this message, called ClientSI (client specific information object) represent the OIDs 
and the snmpEngineId of the requester. 
If T decides that the request is granted, it replies with a COPS-Decision having a command 
INSTALL.  From now one, whenever A issues the same request, (within the same context and 
formulas still holding), this is granted by the agent. If after some time, T issues a Remove 
Decision, the grant decision of the agent, must be re-confirmed as previously explained  
   
 
5 Related work 
 
We started our work based on the general management agent security configuration proposed 
in the SNMPv3  [6],  [19] specifications. The View Access Control Model  [17] allows the 
definition of view and allowed operations for a set of manager. Its user security model USM 
 [18] provides the supporting mechanisms for manager-agent privacy and authentication. 
These mechanisms must be configured statically and are difficult if management of nomadic 
or multi-homed equipments.  These approaches are extended by our work with context driven 
and conditional management as well as a security model configurable dynamically.   
On of the  first initiative towards simplified and automatic host configuration was started by 
the zero-configuration group at the IETF  [9], where individual (private network) addresses are 
automatically got assigned without requesting static configuration or DHCP  [10] support. 
Policy based network management has been applied for QoS management in both Diffserv as 
well as Intserv  [1] types of networks, without however addressing the self-management issue. 
A policy based approach for the auto-configuration of networks is proposed in the Nestor  [14] 
platform used to manage an active network platform. Change operations are managed via 
policy rules and integrated within a larger network self configurability architecture.  The 
research community working in access control mechanisms proposed a large variety of 
security architecture and policy specification methods. However, no direct applications 
towards extending the management functionality based on these concepts have been 
proposed. 
Our approach is different with respect to the previously mentioned work in several aspects.  
We start with the main objective to use SNMPv3 the standard management protocol in an 
autonomic way. We propose a novel architecture for an SNMP agent capable to integrate 
within existing deployed networks and without requiring a complex additional infrastructure 
at the network site.    
We have not yet decided to use a specific policy specification framework. Our current 
prototype uses a proprietary solution. We are looking into applying the PONDER 
specification framework  [16] for this purpose. PONDER provides an extremely powerful 
language which could be capable to express management authorizations as well as context 
related information.    
 
   
 
6 Conclusions 
 
We addressed in this paper the issue of flexible network management, respectively self-
management. We started with the observation that current standardized network management 
frameworks do not offer enough support for enhanced agent autonomy.  The simple 
observation is that an already configured SNMPv3 agent, taken out from his home network 
and put under the management control of one or several foreign management applications 
without any additional human interaction is not functional. This is due to several factors. 
Firstly, a fixed security Model (USM) and a fixed Access Module (VACM) are incapable to 
configure on their own. A second factor, which is more conceptual, is related to the existing 
management paradigm, in which a manager interacts directly with an agent. We extend this 
paradigm by allowing other parties (managers) to express their agreement within such an 
interaction.  We provide a framework allowing context/location driven management and 
conditional management.  
We argue that current SNMPv3 specification provide an excellent authorization and access 
control mechanism for a fixed environment.  This is the case with most existing target 
environments.  However, nomadic environments where more and more users are mobile 
require new management frameworks. We addressed this issue by assuming the standard 
management protocol SNMPv3 and we proposed an extension of the SNMPv3 management 
framework. A new security model and an access control are proposed in our paper. The 
proposed security model allows the exchange of the authentication and privacy keys. These 
keys are used by the SNMPv3 user security model. 
Our management framework is based on authorization policies and provisional actions in 
which context driven management can be performed. The context is defined by the network 
connectivity properties used on the managed equipment site. Our approach generalizes the 
View based Access Control subsystem proposed in the SNMPv3 architecture, without 
requiring changes at the SNMP protocol level. Thus, our extension is transparent for already 
existing management applications. Existing management agent should be easily modified in 
order to enable dynamic access control to MIB objects. 
We consider that self-management is strongly related to the auto-configuration of the 
management plane. Management of mobile devices as well as environments where multiple 
management applications interact dynamically are the primary immediate business targets. 
Our approach is based on managing the management stack within a policy based solution. As 
far as we know, no previous work has integrated SNMP based management and Policy based 
management in this way. This integration shows also the complementary nature of these two 
types of management and motivates the necessity of having both of them within a single 
management stack.  
We are currently implementing the proposed architecture within a Net-SNMP framework. It 
will be validated within our IPv6 testbed. 
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